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ABSTRACT
A study was carried out to examine the impacts of risk characteristics on equity pricing of tax
credits issued under the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC). The results
indicate that credit pricing is not correlated with most traditional real estate risk factors. We
hypothesize that risks are mitigated by the services of syndicators, who act as intermediaries
between developers and investors, thus managing the perceived risk of the investment. We
tested this theory by examining the impact of individual syndicators on credit prices.
Additionally, we tested the effect of syndicator fees and other syndicator-specific fixed effects on
credit prices. Findings suggest that syndicator fixed effects and fees impact pricing, as do certain
tax structure characteristics of the LIHTC developments. Developers appear to be less price-
sensitive than investors, reflecting perhaps different levels of negotiating power in their
relationships with syndicators, as well as lack of perfect information. Investors appear to focus
more on internal rate of return than on price per unit of credit in their investment decisions,
thereby confusing the relationship between syndicator effects and credit prices for investors.
Housing policy implications and directions for future research are also discussed.
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Introduction
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program provides a policy model
intended to achieve public and private goals simultaneously; private investors receive financial
benefits from the program while providing needed capital for the public purpose of developing
affordable housing. The mechanism by which tax credit equity is priced and the factors that
influence pricing provide insight into several key financial and policy implications of the
program. The program is intentionally structured to incorporate market mechanisms and
financial incentives for investors, and the continued success of the program depends on
investors' ongoing willingness to purchase the credits. By examining the factors that determine
pricing, we can infer investor preferences and attempt to understand how efficiently the market
brings the necessary returns to investors and thus maintains continued investment. This is
significant both in the raw level of housing produced and in the relative efficiency of the indirect
subsidy, since the price of equity influences the ability of the tax credit to work as a stand-alone
production program. Moreover, in policy terms, the credit price offered to developers
determines the amount of equity available for housing production. Therefore, the historical and
future credit prices will likely impact both the financial as well as political success of the
program.
Reflecting the federal government's devolution of the last two decades, the LIHTC
essentially functions as a block grant to states by providing direct access to federal funds while
retaining local control. The primary players involved in the LIHTC are the state finance
allocating agencies, developers who apply for credits, investors who provide equity in exchange
for credits, and syndicators who create funds of tax credit properties in order to facilitate the
exchange of tax credit investments between developers and investors. Over the program's
lifespan, competition for the credits has resulted in increased equity prices, declining yields and
increased intermediary sophistication and specialization. In its early years, the program was
criticized for inefficiency due to the need for multiple layers of funding, often requiring other
government subsidies, resulting in high transaction costs and a relatively low percent of credit
sale proceeds going towards actual development as opposed to intermediary costs (Stegman).
However, increasing competition and sophistication of program participants over time have
greatly increased efficiency; proponents assert that now 94 percent of each tax credit dollar spent
by the federal government goes to housing (Roberts and Harvey). These financial trends reflect
a lower perceived risk of the investment.
Although LIHTC investments can provide many of the same benefits of conventional real
estate investment - such as depreciation, cash flow, and capital appreciation - the investors
primarily invest to receive the federal income tax credits. Therefore, the tax structure of the deal
is more important to investors than traditional real estate characteristics. Moreover, tax credit
properties are generally not sold as individual properties, but rather are packaged into funds by
syndicators, thus diversifying much of the idiosyncratic risk. This paper examines the effect of
such risk management by syndicators on investor risk perceptions, measured by the price that
investors are willing to pay per unit of tax credit. Through an original dataset of 186 properties,
we have examined the effect of traditional real estate characteristics, fixed effects of several
syndicators, and syndicator fees on equity pricing, through which conclusions can be drawn
about investor risk and return expectations. The results indicate that syndicators play a pivotal
role in managing investor's perceived risks, but it is unclear who ultimately bears the costs of
these services. It appears that developers and investors value syndicators' services differently,
and the syndicator effects alone do not explain all variations in credit price, possibly reflecting
other less tangible factors that also impact returns.
Section 1: Overview of Policy and Financial Aspects of the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit
1.1 Origins of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
The LIHTC evolved out of two simultaneous trends in the mid 1980's: privatization of
federal housing programs and a reduction in real estate tax incentives. Since the 1960's federal
housing intervention has focused on demand-based programs funded through direct federal
allocations. The policy shift began after federally allocated and administered programs were
seen as largely ineffective. Public housing was viewed as inefficient, narrow, and high in social
costs, while programs that included a private component, such as Sections 8 and 236 which
channeled funds to developers, were criticized for their overgenerous subsidies to developers and
perverse incentives that encouraged speculative investment. However, changes in the incentive
structure were followed by overdevelopment and subsequent highly public loan debacles,
including the Savings and Loans crisis (Orlebeke).
As a salve to both the real estate and housing advocacy industries, in 1986 Congress
replaced both the previous real estate tax incentives and other federally assisted housing
programs with the LIHTC. Initially a poorly understood program, tax credits were left unused
during its first few years. Much of the hesitation was due not only to the complicated structure
of the program and the lack of industry expertise in its use, but also the uncertainty surrounding
its legislative fate. During its first few years, numerous attempts were made to repeal or reduce
the credit, including one successful attempt to reduce the tax credit allocation in 1989 (although
it was increased back to its original level the following year). Not until 1993 did the tax credit
receive annual automatic allocation. This immediately changed the perception of the program
from a yearly gamble to a permanent government program, immediately reducing its systemic
risk.
Since its inception in 1986, the LIHTC industry has grown from a handful of individual
developers and investors to a large niche industry complete with its own secondary market and
advocacy interests. The evolution of the industry has been in large part due to the significant
federal tax spending on the LIHTC, much of which has been as a consequence of the elimination
or reduction in other federal housing programs. The federal government spent $3.2 billion in
fiscal year 1998 and is estimated to spend $19.6 billion from 1998 to 2000 in LIHTC tax
expenditures (Orlebeke). This compares to $1.61 billion in fiscal year 2000 for HOME funds
which focus on rehabilitation, acquisition and construction of low-income family housing for
both renters and owners, and $100 million in 2000 for Section 521 which funds rural housing
efforts through the Department of Agriculture's rental housing programs (Schussheim). Due to
the investment in tax credits, roughly 550,000 to 600,000 units for low-income families were
placed in service in the first ten years through the LIHTC (Cummings & DiPasquale).
In late 2000, due to heavy lobbying by such diverse groups as the National Multifamily
Homebuilders Association, the National Association of State Housing Finance Agencies, and
low-income advocacy groups, the state per capita tax credit allocation was increased to a two-
year phased increase of 50 cents up to $1.75 and indexed to inflation thereafter. A notable
difference between the LIHTC program and other affordable housing programs (indeed, most
social policy programs) is the level of public support, bolstered by the relatively broad base of
participants who all enjoy some level of benefits. The coalition behind the tax credit includes
not only low-income housing advocates but private investors and various financial intermediaries
including syndicators who provide services to the industry. The successful legislation indicates
the diverse and powerful interest groups that the tax credit has created, making it likely that its
future will be secure.
1.2 Program Mechanics
The LIHTC is unique in that it is funded by the Treasury, overseen by the IRS, and
administered by state agencies. Conspicuously absent from the program's administration is the
Department of Housing and Urban Development which is not substantively involved in the
program despite its housing mission. Currently, the federal government allocates each state
$1.25 per capita in tax credits. State finance agencies administer the credits through a
competitive process whereby they seek applications from developers planning multifamily
projects with an affordable housing component. Developers are selected based on criteria
determined primarily by the state based on local housing needs and goals. Although the goals
are determined locally, the federal government also requires that states meet specific selection
criteria including preferences for developments that serve the lowest-income tenants and those
located in difficult to develop areas or qualified census tracts. Additionally, since 1989, all states
have been required to allocate at least 10 percent of the credits to non-profit developers or joint
partnerships between for-profit and non-profit developers. Most states accept applications twice
a year and award allocations accordingly.
Once a developer is selected, the amount of credits allocated by the state agency depends
on the type of development and total development costs of the project. For new construction and
rehabilitation, the tax credit rate is approximately 9 percent per year over ten years, calculated in
order to achieve a present value of 70 percent. For building acquisition, minor rehabilitation, and
federally subsidized buildings receiving below-market rate loans (including bonds), the building
receives approximately 4 percent per year, yielding a 30 percent present value. Once total
development costs are known, the eligible basis is calculated which generally consists of the
development costs minus the land and certain types of subsidies. The qualified basis is then
determined by the percentage of low-income units multiplied by the eligible basis. An investor
will provide equity based off of the qualified basis and applicable tax credit rate by purchasing
tax credits at a rate below the anticipated future tax benefits. Once selected, the projects must be
placed in service within two years or risk recapture of credits.
Although the timing of the process varies, as will be discussed later, once developers
receive an allocation of tax credits, they generally sell their credits in exchange for up-front
equity to a syndicator. The syndicator offers the developer a set price per dollar of tax credit
based on the market value of the credit. The market value may be relatively elusive since the
developer may have little independent or public information as to the current price of credits,
although they are free to shop their credits to a number of syndicators in an attempt to receive the
highest possible price. The higher price per credit a developer receives, the more equity will go
directly to the project thus reducing the need for other sources of permanent or gap financing.
Once a developer secures a syndicator, the syndicator buys the credits and compiles a LIHTC
fund to attract investors. Once investors are secured, the syndicator sells the credits to investors
at a premium from the price paid to the developers. For example, if a syndicator buys credits
from a developer for 80 cents, it may charge a 10 percent load for its services and, in turn, sell
the credits to an investor for 88 cents on the fund level. This spread is the syndicator's profit for
their intermediation services. As can be seen, the price per credit is the starting point for
measuring the most basic elements of risk and return to all key players in any LIHTC
development.
Once the development is placed in service, it must remain in low-income use for at least
30 years, although investors receive benefits for only 10 years and property owners may elect to
end low-income use after 15 years if certain conditions are met. Since final development costs
are often unknown until construction completion, the final tax credits are adjusted at the end of
construction. For this reason, many funds include timing adjustments and credit guarantees to
safeguard investors. In order to qualify as low-income, rents must remain in accordance with
LIHTC program guidelines. Unlike other federal programs, the LIHTC rent guidelines are not
based on individual tenant incomes, but on metropolitan household income and expenses.
Therefore, tenants may pay somewhat more or less than the typical 30 percent threshold of their
income on rent (McClure). Project set-aside levels are also based on metropolitan data. Each tax
credit project must serve households with incomes no more than 60 percent of the area median
income. Generally, the developments must set aside either 20 percent or more of the units for
households with incomes 50 percent or less of the area median gross income or set aside 40
percent or more of the units for households with 60 percent or less of the area median gross
income.' Different aspects of program compliance and financial stability are monitored through
syndicators, the IRS, and state agencies. As an additional incentive to sustain investor's interest,
investors risk recapture of the tax credits if the property falls out of compliance. Therefore,
investors and agents acting for investors have strong incentives to ensure that the property meets
all ongoing compliance requirements.
1 In practice, most developers use the 60 percent threshold since it allows higher rents and, therefore, can make the
project more financially feasible.
1.3 Tax Credit Investor Benefits and Risks
In addition to the tax credit benefits, the LIHTC provides investors the typical real estate
benefits of passive income deductions, potential cash flow dividends and any capital
appreciation. However, through interviews with both investors and syndicators, it is clear that
the primary motive for investment is the tax credit benefit. The anticipated internal rate of return
(IRR) of a project is calculated incorporating all benefits. On a typical project 23 percent of the
benefits accrue from depreciation, 2 percent from cash flow, and fully 75 percent from tax
credits. The tax credits are also the most stable and predictable source of benefits. Barring
foreclosure or noncompliance, the investors will continue to receive the same federal tax credit
on a dollar-for-dollar basis every year regardless of the actual real estate performance.
Additionally, affordable housing is seen as having an unlimited demand, making large vacancies
unlikely. Due to these factors, the investment is now compared to other potential low to
moderate risk commodities.
Since the mid 1990's, the typical investor has shifted from individuals to corporations.
Earlier in the program, individual investors played a larger role but as competition increased
larger equity investments were required, and changes in passive income rules and the effects of
the alternative minimum tax caused individual investors to exit the market. Some corporate
investors have also exited the market as yields have declined, causing the evolution of a
secondary market. Because of the liquidity constraints and the relatively small pool of active
investors, the secondary market tends to be highly specialized and underutilized. However, the
financial services industry has maintained a strong presence in LIHTC investments due to
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements. As part of their CRA requirements,
financial institutions are required to invest in the communities in which they do business. Since
these institutions can receive CRA credit for tax credit investments in their geographic region,
their yield threshold is often lower due to their non-market objectives.
Despite these factors, the investments are not without risk. The tax credit risk for the
investor begins once the credit is allocated. According to tax credit regulations, a project
receiving tax credits must be placed in service within two years of allocation. If it is delayed, the
developer and investor run the risk of credit recapture. Additionally, investors do not receive the
credits until the project is placed in service. Therefore, investors are very concerned with timely
completion so that their investment does not erode due to larger than anticipated discounting. In
other words, if investors expects to receive $1.00 of tax credits one year after they make the
investment and they have a discount rate of 10 percent, they anticipate beginning to earn $0.91 of
credit in year two. If the project is delayed, then the initial tax credit benefits and all subsequent
benefits are discounted an additional year. Instead of receiving $0.91 in year two, the investors
would not receive any credit benefits until year three when they would receive $0.83 in
discounted terms.
Once the project is placed in service, it must meet compliance requirements as monitored
by the state allocating agencies. These requirements are primarily intended to ensure low-
income occupancy by qualified residents and appropriate rent levels. Although very rare, if a
project falls significantly out of compliance, the investor can risk recapture of the credits. This is
a significant penalty since the investor must pay back the accelerated portion (calculated based
on noncompliance criteria) of the tax credits, plus interest, for all prior years. If the project
becomes financially unsound, creditors can also foreclose on the property as with any other real
estate investment, also resulting in recapture of credits.
Financial solvency of the development can be in jeopardy if expenses suddenly increase
substantially since the rents are capped and cannot be raised to compensate for any unanticipated
increases. As will be discussed later, however; the actual risk of foreclosure may be lower than
for conventional properties due to the prevalence of public lenders. Additionally, the investment
is considered highly illiquid since it must be held for ten years. Operational risk is likely the
highest risk since multiple set-aside levels and compliance reviews can be complicated to
administer. Additionally, tax credit properties, like other low-income housing properties, are
generally seen to have higher management risks than conventional properties with higher-income
tenant populations. On the other hand, the government risks have been substantially reduced
since enactment of the increased allocation and permanent funding legislation, but are still
present since investors do not receive their full benefits for at least 10 years.
1.4 Financial Trends
Since 1993, two significant and well-documented trends have emerged in the LIHTC
industry: increased competition for tax credits on the part of investors and a related higher price
per unit of credit causing declining investor yields. The competition has been primarily due to
the increased comfort and sophistication of players within the program. In 1987, only 18 percent
of the total available credits were allocated by states. By 1995, 97 percent of the authorization
that year was allocated by states with 37 of 54 authorizing agencies allocating their full
authorization (Cummings and DiPasquale). In response to this increased competition, federal
allocation rules have been modified. Beginning in 1990, federal rules changed to require state
finance agencies to award at least 10 percent of all tax credits to non-profit developers. One
result of this legislation has been an increase in partnerships between for-profit and non-profit
developers. Additionally, projects located in difficult to develop areas or qualified census tracts
also receive 30 percent larger credits.
Because of the increased competition, developers are able to extract more equity from
each unit of credit awarded. This has been a positive development for developers who have seen
tax credits rise from an average price per unit of 42 cents in 1987 to 65 cents in 1996.
Alternatively, investors have seen yields decline since they must pay more for the same one
dollar of tax credits (Ernst & Young). Rates have dropped to an average after-tax rate return of
10 to 12 percent in 1996 compared to 18 percent in 1990 (Ernst & Young). However, the lower
yields accurately reflect the lower perceived risk of tax credit investments.
Decreased risk and increased attractiveness to investors is also due to the involvement of
syndicators throughout the process. Syndicators purchase tax credits from developers, package
tax credit developments into funds to diversify investments, and provide asset management and
compliance services to reduce the risk of foreclosure or recapture. Sponsors choose the best mix
of projects and developers to create a fund that meets specific investment objectives. Typically,
they buy about 70 percent of the property before raising capital. At closing they receive an
acquisition fee of around 5.5 percent. At the end of the second year, if the fund's projected
stabilized yield is realized, they collect an additional one percent fee. During years one through
ten they typically receive a 0.6 percent annual asset management fee. Finally, after 15 years
when the fund is liquidated, they collect a disposition fee along with 2 to 3 percent of any
residual value in the properties after investors are repaid (Rudnisky).
The intermediary role of syndicators has followed the traditional evolution of many
financial services by moving from broad generalist to targeted service offerings. As a response
to market changes, syndicators have internally reorganized and consolidated in order to offer
more specific services to a broader range of investors. This has resulted in numerous strategic
alliances between banks and real estate syndicators such as Boston Capital and Bank of America;
and Banc One Capital Corporation and Boston Financial (Mishra, June 1998). The overall
effect on the tax credit industry has again been lowered risk to investors due to standardization of
the credits, savings from economies of scale, and specialization of funds.
While most corporate investors buy units or "shares" of a fund, some highly specialized
investors purchase tax credits through single-investor funds created specifically to meet their
investment objectives. These investors typically tend to have strong in-house capacity for real
estate investment and tax credit expertise, as well as specific interests in promoting housing for
non-market objectives. The largest of these investors is the Fannie Mae Corporation which
works through syndicators to compile funds, often targeting specific geographic regions in order
to increase corporate exposure to promote their housing products and mission within a targeted
community. In the early 1990's when the syndicator market was less sophisticated and
specialized, Fannie Mae often syndicated their own projects through direct investments, although
they now more typically work through outside syndicators. Because syndicators create funds
specifically for these investors, these funds tend to attract the highest quality projects and most
experienced developers. Unfortunately, obtaining information about these single-investor funds
is difficult and, therefore, additional comparisons between single and multiple-investor funds are
difficult to delineate.
1.5 Permanent and Gap Financing in LIHTC Projects
While conventional real estate may often be financed through equity and a single
mortgage loan, tax credit properties usually fall short of covering total costs through primary
loans due to lower than expected income from restricted rents. Thus tax credits are generally not
used in isolation; rather, they serve as leverage to acquire multiple sources of permanent debt,
often at favorable terms. This permanent debt is often composed of multiple layers of both
public and private loans, grants and other sources of gap financing, defined as any sources of
funds required beyond the primary mortgage loan. Funding requirements as well as legislative
adjustments have enabled the tax credit to be combined with other sources of funding. With
higher price per unit of credits, some of the need for multiple funding layers has decreased since
developers are able to receive more equity out of each allocation. Unfortunately, this trend has
coincided with increased construction costs causing additional layers of debt to still be necessary
(Odman). The percent of total development costs provided by gap financing has remained
relatively constant over time, at about 16 percent of total development costs (Cummings &
DiPasquale).
An increasingly common secondary funding source for developers has been tax-exempt
bonds. The federal government sets a funding ceiling for tax-exempt bond allocations for private
activities, and states determine what share of these bond funds will go to housing purposes. State
allocating agencies (often the same finance agencies administering the tax credit) are charged
with distributing bond allocations related to housing. A particularly attractive feature of the
bond is that once a developer receives a bond allocation, the developer does not have to enter the
same competition for tax credits. Additionally, interest rates on such bonds are often less than
conventional long-term financing (Mishra, Dec. 1998). The increased use of bonds has also
given states a more active role underwriting transactions and structuring projects (Mishra, Dec.
1998). Some of the drawbacks of bond financing include the 4 percent limit which provide a less
stable source of benefits to investors since more of the benefits come from cash flow rather than
credits. Nevertheless, market players have responded with bond programs designed to offset
some of these downsides. For example, Freddie Mac initiated the "Multifamily Housing Bond
Credit Enhancement Program" in which borrowers can obtain credit enhancement for properties
financed with proceeds from tax-exempt bonds (Mishra, June 1998). Fannie Mae has also
responded by lowering the fee for bond credit enhancement. As a reflection of their popularity,
the bond allocation has also recently been increased. In October 1998, Congress increased the
cap on bonds by $5 per capita beginning in fiscal 2003 for a total increase of $25 per capita until
2007 (Mishra Dec. 1998).
While multiple sources of funds are often necessary to make low income deals work,
there are some restrictions and regulations regarding the packaging of these funds, primarily
intended to ensure that developers do not receive more subsidies than they actually need.
Programs receiving federal funds must go through a HUD subsidy layering review administered
at the state level. Additionally, since 1996, housing authorities have been allowed to combine
public housing funds with private financing, including the LIHTC. This has been particularly
important for HOPE VI projects which often take the bulk of a state's tax credits (Guggenheim).
If funds are considered federal grants, they count against the eligible basis, so funds are often
channeled through housing authorities. Public housing operating subsidies and Section 8
assistance can be considered non-federal grants so that operating subsidies would not reduce the
amount of tax credits a project could earn.
Section 2: Data Characteristics and Methodology
In order to assess risk perception and the role of the syndicator, we collected property and
fund level information on 186 properties comprising 16,575 units. All of the properties received
credit allocations between 1997-2000 and were syndicated through large, for-profit syndicators.
The data was collected from due diligence reports written by Ernst & Young's Affordable
Housing Services Group, which provides consulting services related to the LIHTC to both
investors and syndicators. The data include information on property type, location, developer
characteristics, debt sources, amounts, and terms, rental set-asides, characteristics of the tax
credit allocation, and sponsoring syndicator. A full list of data fields collected is attached in
Appendix A.
The reports from which data were obtained offered somewhat limited information on
local markets, both in terms of neighborhood demographic and economic characteristics and
comparison of the tax credit properties to surrounding real estate. Since exact addresses were not
included, it is also impossible to discover more neighborhood information from census data or
similar sources; thus our analysis will not attempt to discuss results dealing with residents or
local conditions. However, our primary research questions relate to the impact of various risk
factors on credit pricing, and the sample offers quite detailed information on a variety of
potential risk factors.
Although the funds sampled include a variety of properties from across the nation, some
bias is evident in the general characteristics of the properties documented. In particular, the
funds represent standard grade investment quality deals, around the middle of the desirability
range. We found a low incidence of "difficult" projects, particularly urban properties in high-
crime or otherwise undesirable neighborhoods, including HOPE VI redevelopment projects. On
the other end, the funds reviewed are less likely to have the top quality and most desirable
projects, since these are likely to be included in single investor funds or those held by direct
investors. Additionally, our data is exclusively drawn from the period 1997-2000; some
differences are likely between projects assembled in the early years of the program and this later,
more mature stage. The table below presents the general parameters of our sample compared
with samples used in two of the more extensive previous studies: City Research (1998) and Abt
Associates for HUD (1996). The authors of the City Research study, Jean Cummings and
Denise DiPasquale, used data obtained from four national syndicators, reviewing 2,554
properties (150,570 units) receiving allocations between 1987-96, roughly 25 percent of total
units produced during this period (Cummings and DiPasquale). The Abt study is drawn from the
database using reports compiled from all state allocating agencies over the duration of the
program; some reporting problems have made this database incomplete, and the range of data
collected is quite narrow, but it is the most complete sample of properties assembled.
Sample Properties' Characteristics
Number of
observations
186 6,575 1 2,554 150,570 3,987 16,U40
Region 2
Northeast 12.4% 13.8% 22.3% 19.8% 13.7% 12.9%
Midwest 25.9% 18.0% 22.8% 20.4% 32.5% 27.0%
South 30.8% 40.0% 39.3% 43.4% 39.1% 41.6%
West 30.8% 28.2% 15.6% 16.4% 14.7% 18.7%
RHS financed3 14.1% 5.7% 38.3% 21.2% 34.5% 25.7%
Developer status
Nonprofit 8.1% 4.6% 31.2% 27.4% 20.3% 23.2%
For-profit 71.5% 76.8% NA NA NA NA
Both 16.7% 14.4% NA NA NA NA
Public 3.8% 4.3% NA NA NA NA
Project Type 73.1% 66.6% 68.0% 64.5% 65.9% 60.7%
New Const.
Rehabilitation4  26.9% 33.4% 32.0% 35.5% 34.1% 39.3%
Project size
5-36 Units 30.1% 9.2% 47.9% 20.0% NA NA
37-50 Units 14.5% 7.3% 18.8% 14.0% NA NA
51-99 Units 22.6% 18.7% 17.1% 20.3% 12.6% NA
100+ Units 32.8% 64.7% 16.2% 45.8% 9.8% NA
Location'
Central City 29.6% 43.1% 42.9% 48.2% 49.1% 54.4%
Suburban 25.3% 31.5% 24.4% 31.6% 21.0% 26.1%
Nonmetropolitan 45.2% 25.4% 32.7% 20.2% 29.9% 19.5%
Property type6
Family 75.8% 80.8% NA NA NA NA
Senior 21.0% 16.5% NA NA NA NA
Both 3.2% 2.7% NA NA NA NA
2 A listing of states by regions can be found in Appendix B.
3 RHS refers to the Rural Housing Services, previously the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), which
administers Section 515 Rural Rental Housing Program. The program provides low-interest mortgages for rural
rental housing development, including many LIHTC properties. Mortgages are usually one percent interest on 50-
year terms.
4 Some LIHTC properties qualify for additional credits under historic rehabilitation; in our sample these properties
(four in total) will be categorized together with rehabilitation projects.
s The location categories are defined as follows: "Central city" is the main city or cities of a metropolitan area;
suburban is within a metropolitan area but not within a central city; non-metropolitan is located outside a
metropolitan area and is largely but not exclusively rural.
6 Both elderly and family properties can receive tax credit funding; a few properties target a mixed population, as
noted under "Both".
Table 1:
As shown in Table 1, our sample is most heavily weighted towards properties in the
South and West, with the smallest percentage in the Northeast. These proportions are fairly
similar to the HUD study; the Cummings and DiPasquale study leans more heavily towards the
Northeast, in part because their data was taken directly from syndicators, several of whom are
located in the Northeast. The proportion of properties receiving funding from the Rural Housing
Service is considerably lower than in the two previous studies, which can be explained by policy
changes in the program that result in a sharp decrease in production under the Section 515
program after 1995, prior to our sample properties. Compared with the City Research survey,
our sample contains fewer small and mid-sized properties, with nearly twice the percent of very
large properties (greater than 100 units). This may be due to selection preferences of the funds
or due to the increasing competition for credits that benefits larger properties with economies of
scale in production. Additionally, our sample has a relatively high proportion of properties using
tax-exempt bonds, a fairly recent funding option, and bond-funded properties have a much
higher likelihood of being very large than those using conventional credits. As noted before, our
sample has a much smaller proportion of properties in urban areas than either of the two previous
surveys, and a much higher proportion in non-metropolitan areas. Some of this difference is
likely due to fund selection preferences, since urban properties may either be more "difficult"
and less desirable for investment purposes, or may be highly prized by direct investors and single
investor funds.
Source and Size of Primary Loans, by Lender Status
rrivate 40.8%
55.5% 28.2% 16.7%
Public 108 58.7% 40.9% 47.2% 11.9%
Federal (non-RHS)l0  5 2.7% 34.5% 39.0% 26.5%
State 66 35.9% 44.5% 46.9% 8.6%
Local 15 8.2% 38.5% 42.2% 19.2%
RHS" 19 10.3% 34.3% 52.3% 13.4%
Non-profit 1 0.5% 39.4% 37.0% 23.6%
Total 184 100.0% 46.8% 39.5% 13.9%
Table 2 shows the breakdown of primary loans by lender status, and the relative amounts
of costs provided by equity, primary loan, and gap financing. As shown below, nearly 60
percent of first loans were provided by public sources, while 40 percent of first loans were
obtained from banks or other private lenders. To the extent that public lenders are reluctant to
foreclose on tax credit properties, this trend would indicate lower levels of financial risk for
many of the properties. Moreover, while approximately 96 percent of first loans were hard
loans, nearly half had concessionary or below-market interest rates or loan terms. The relative
size of primary loans varies considerably by lender type as well. State issued loans and RHS
loans provide the largest amount of debt, while private lenders provide the smallest proportion of
total costs. This raises the question of whether the high proportion of costs from equity in
projects with private primary lenders reflects higher equity prices in those properties, or simply
7 Percentage of total development cost from all equity sources.
8 Percentage of total development cost from the first "primary" loan.
9 Percentage of total development cost from all sources of gap financing (non-equity or permanent financing).
10 Federal funding source not inclusive of funds from the Rural Housing Services program.
Table 2:
greater reluctance of private lenders to issue large loans to tax credit deals. This question will be
addressed later in the model estimates. Just over 20 percent of the primary loans used tax-
exempt bonds, almost all issued by public sources, most commonly state agencies. Overall, the
percent of total costs from gap financing is slightly lower in our sample than cited by Cummings
and DiPasquale, which could be due to the higher equity prices obtained in more recent years.
" Funds from federal Rural Housing Services program.
Section 3: Conventional Pricing Model
3.1 Risk and Return Correlated to Real Estate Characteristics
In traditional market-rate real estate investments, expected investor returns are a function
of perceived risk of the individual properties. The expected returns can be estimated through the
price investors are willing to pay for equity in any particular deal; a relatively high equity price
will result in lower returns to investors, reflecting a lower risk of the underlying asset. The risk-
return relationship in pricing LIHTC investments should operate the same way. This assumption
is reinforced by the observation that as investor risk perception has declined over time, price per
unit of credit has risen, driving down investor returns. LIHTC investments derive most of their
return from the tax benefits of the credits, with some additional benefits (as with traditional real
estate) from cash flow and capital appreciation. However, since the receipt of tax credit benefits
is contingent on the successful development and operation of the property, one would expect to
see similar relationships between risk from property characteristics and equity pricing, just as in
a conventional market investment. Given this expected outcome, we developed a model that
assesses the impact of key property and financial risk characteristics on price per unit of tax
credit.
The financial risks include potential income shortfalls, leading to loan default and
foreclosure. We collected data on a variety of factors that could indicate level of financial risk:
total costs and costs per unit, level of rental discount, year of credit allocation, use of tax-exempt
bonds, status of primary lender, terms of primary loan, debt coverage ratio, ratio of primary loan
to total value, and number of debt sources used. We would expect those characteristics that
traditionally indicate increased financial risk - high overall or per unit costs, significant rental
discounts, market rate loans from private lenders, lower debt coverage ratio, high loan to value
ratio, and high number of debt sources - to have a negative impact on the credit price, indicating
that investors expect a higher return in exchange for assuming those risks. Regression 1 in Table
3 shows the results of the estimate, using price per unit of credit as the dependent variable.
Additionally, we tested the impact of various operational risk factors on credit pricing. Factors
that might be expected to affect the level of risk include type of construction, region, type of
development, location relative to metropolitan area, developer status and experience, and number
of income set-asides. Regression 2 in Table 3 shows the estimated effect of operational risk
factors on credit price, and Regression 3 shows the combined model using all these financial and
real estate characteristics.
Table 3: Estimated Model of Price per Credit by Financial and Real Estate
Characteristics12
Total Development Cost/Unit 1.28e-07
(1.26e-07)
8.68e-08
(1.64e-07)
Moderate rental Discount .0062 .0120
(.0203) (.0231)
Significant Rental Discount .0010 .0143
(.0158) (.0200)
Very Significant Rental Discount .0121
(.0161)
.0139
(.0206)
1998 Allocation
1999 Allocation
2000 Allocation
Tax-exempt Bond
Private Primary Lender
12 Variables significant at either 5 percent or 10 percent level are shaded. * Indicates significance at the 5 percent
level and ** indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
(.0153) (.0163)
Rural Housing Services Primary .0145 .0220
Lender (.0189) (.0215)
State Primary Lender -.0230* -.0310**
(.0155) (.0166)
Soft Primary Loan .0016 .0093
(.0146) (.0197)
Market Rate Primary Loan -.0064 
-.0045
(.0081) (.0101)
Debt Coverage Ratio .0364** .0356
(.0209) (.0236)
First Loan-to-Total Value Ratio .0266 .0138
(.0260) (.0247)
Number of Debt Sources .0053 .0035
(.0033) (.0039)
New Construction 
-.0135 .0040
(.0089) (.0092)
Midwest 
.0140 .0136
(.0130) (.0138)
South .0066 -.0013
(.0129) (.0131)
West .0063 -.0019
(.0133) (.0131)
Family Property 
-.0015 .0112
(.0098) (.0082)
Family and Senior Property .0222** .004*
(.01 17) (.0141)
Suburban Location .0130 .0097
(.0105) (.0094)
Non-metro Location -.0025 .0026
(.0092) (.0098)
Non-Profit Developer Involved .0022 .0003
(.0084) (.0082)
Developer Net Worth 1.60e-10* 2.19e-13
(8l9-1) (5.79e- 11)
Number of Income Level Set- -.0019 .0033
asides (.0043) (.0042)
Constant (intercept) .6742* .7741* .6563*
(.0350) (.0160) (.0429)
R-squared .4249 .0678 .4618
N 170 184 169
As the table above shows, most of the financial and real estate risk factors that we would
expect to affect credit pricing appear to have no significant impact. The only significant
variables are total development cost, year of allocation, use of tax-exempt bonds, and primary
loans from private or state lenders. The larger the total development cost of the deal, the higher
the price per unit is, reflecting perhaps investors' preference for large projects that yield more tax
credits. As found in previous studies, price per unit of credit increases with each successive
year, reflecting investors' increasing comfort with the program and higher levels of competition,
resulting in lower required returns. The use of tax-exempt bonds also increases credit prices,
perhaps because these deals allow developers to avoid competition for credits and thus may be
easier to package, decreasing risk through the allocation process. The status of two types of
primary lenders is significant. Private lenders may well be seen as more likely to foreclose on
properties than public lenders, thus increasing the risk of those developments. It is unclear,
however, why a primary loan from the state would increase risk. While the coefficient on the
dummy "both" for both elderly and family units in the property is significant, this is probably the
result of the small number of observations in this category.
In general, the model indicates that investors are not pricing credits according to
traditional real estate risk factors in our sample. Rather, the significant variables mostly refer to
the amount and type of credits received and competition for credits among investors. Given this
finding, other variables we might expect to have an impact would be whether the credits are 4
percent or 9 percent, and the point during construction when investors join the process.
However, data on these variables were not available. It is interesting to note that even variables
that might reasonably impact compliance risk (such as number of set-asides, which complicate
compliance and reporting) or straightforward financial risk (debt coverage ratio) have no
discernable impact on pricing.
The lack of relationship between traditional risk factors and pricing was confirmed by
interviews with syndicators and investors. As Jeff Goldstein, Director of Acquisitions at Boston
Capital stated, "Investor returns are not based on development economics but on tax credits." In
market-rate investments the price per unit of tax credit should reflect the risk of the property
since risk impacts the investors' expected return. These findings are partly explained by the fact
that investors rely more on estimated IRR than price measures in making investment decisions.
The IRR calculation for these investments tends to be very complicated and sensitive to multiple
factors, particularly investment timing, since it is composed of several different benefit streams.
In most cases, the IRR is calculated on a fund rather than a property level as well. Thus, from
the investor perspective, traditional real estate or financial risks seem less important than tax
structure of the deal and market level competition for the credits in our sample.
Section 4: Syndicator Effects on Equity Prices
4.1 The Role of the Syndicator as Risk Mitigator
As discussed in Section 1.3, investors face a variety of risks when purchasing tax credits:
delays in the development process, cash flow shortfalls and foreclosure, liquidity problems,
property operations, compliance and recapture, regulatory or policy changes, and potential
incentive misalignment with developers. As with other real estate investments, investors face a
complex and highly specialized process, making it difficult for individual investors to obtain
complete information on properties, to accurately assess the level of risk and make informed
investment decisions. Moreover, tax credit properties require continuous monitoring and
oversight from allocation through development and during the entire compliance period in order
for investors to redeem their annual tax credit benefits. Investors vary widely in their level of
interest in evaluating the properties; this seems to vary by level of in-house capacity, size of
investment, and general attitude of the organization towards the investment (Schnitzer).
Because of the need for complex information and ongoing management, the entire
process depends heavily on the intermediary role played by the syndicators. Financial
intermediaries, defined as "economic agents who purchase from suppliers for resale to buyers or
who help buyers and sellers meet and transact" (Spulber 3) are needed in markets with
transaction frictions or information imperfections - conditions clearly met in the tax credit
market. Syndicators manage all of the investor risks described above, mediate between the
interests of the developers and investors, serve as a clearinghouse of information on the
individual assets, and generally maintain smooth functioning of the market for credits. They also
essentially act as an insurance service for investors by not only providing ongoing monitoring or
"preventative" services, but also assurances of available resources if a development becomes
financially unstable.
For each risk faced by investors, syndicators attempt to offer a service designed to
mitigate risk. Typical services include selecting developers and/or properties to include in a
fund, investigating the risk potential of the properties, assisting in securing permanent financing,
marketing funds to investors, structuring fund ownership to align developer and investor
incentives, ongoing asset management and compliance oversight, and diversifying individual
asset risks through fund composition. Besides the straightforward financial duties, many
syndicators are heavily involved in legislative lobbying to retain and expand the tax credit
program. They are also all very concerned with internal policing of the industry since one public
disaster will affect the whole industry. One syndicator said that compliance itself is relatively
easy compared to managing the effects of a highly public development disaster. The industry
players are highly concerned with this potential since if a project becomes crime ridden or
unlivable, it will negatively impact the reputation of the syndicators and the LIHTC program
itself. This is a concern not only for syndicators but also for investors, particularly public
corporations concerned about their community reputation.
The large syndicators take a proprietary approach to managing the investments, managing
risk through each phase of the process, thus allowing investors to delegate responsibility for
detailed monitoring and property oversight. In exchange for these services, investors accept
lower returns. Because of their pivotal role in managing risk, investors often end up evaluating
the syndicators at least as much as the properties when making investment decisions. In effect,
the investor's risk perception is focused less on the real estate, than on the sponsor of the
investment since the syndicator is charged with ensuring the continuing flow of tax credits.
Additionally, given a continuous demand for affordable housing, the investors are generally less
concerned with adequate demand than they are with competent asset management and oversight
of the development process (Goldman). Since the commodification of the investment, investors
tend to consider tax credits relative to other investment opportunities, rather than compare
individual properties within the tax credit industry.
Relationships of both developers and investors with the syndicators play a key role in
transactions, since both parties must select syndicators. As Marc Schnitzer, Director of Related
Capital Company explained, when tax credit allocations are announced, a typical developer will
receive dozens of calls from syndicators trying to compete over price and service. For many
syndicators, securing developers is more difficult than securing investors (Schnitzer). Some
developers might select the syndicator offering the highest price even if that syndicator is less
experienced and offer fewer services. However, most developers in the business already have an
ongoing relationship with syndicators. In fact, many syndicators work with their long-term
developers to package a project before a tax credit allocation is even secured. Therefore, when
developers select syndicators they often base their selection not only on raw price, but on their
general level of comfort and experience working with the syndicator. They tend to seek an
assurance that they will receive their equity in a timely and reliable manner through a large
syndicator with deep resources rather than risk the chance that a smaller syndicator may not have
adequate resources if a development fails. The assurance that larger and more reputable
syndicators provide acts as a type of liquidity insurance for developers. By selecting a
syndicator with deep resources and a large portfolio of properties, they have the added security
that the syndicator will likely stay financially healthy and exist in the long run.
In essence, when selecting a syndicator, developers are buying a brand that they select
based off of prior relationships, track record, developer needs, and services. These services
include assistance in securing permanent financing (which many syndicators now offer in-
house), attracting quality investors, and industry expertise and resources. According to
Schnitzer, securing developers is generally considered more difficult than securing investors.
Although the developers receive their profits up-front in most cases through fees, most also
retain at least a .01 percent general partnership interest for purposes of establishing a legal
ownership structure. Although the interest is small, the developer has some incentive not only to
complete the project, but also to ensure its long-term financial health and is, therefore, also
interested in the asset management capabilities of the syndicator. Syndicators also attempt to
maintain longer-term developer interest by setting equity pay-in schedules that occur over
several extended periods rather than an up-front lump sum.
Since both developers and investors are evaluating the syndicator more than the real
estate, the syndicator's value and reputation are based almost entirely on track record. Although
there is no benchmarking index for LIHTC properties or funds, industry players generally have a
sense of market averages. As Jeff Goldstein explained, the syndicators take on the responsibility
of ensuring that the property realizes the tax credit benefits, and have an incentive to go beyond
ensuring compliance to asset management of the property itself. In the early years of the
program, investors attempted to mitigate their risk by diversifying across syndicator rather than
properties. This had the effect of forcing prices up since smaller syndicators were able to gain
more market share by offering higher prices, ensuring that they were on the same level as larger
syndicators. However, now investors tend to select one or two syndicators and invest in multiple
funds with a single syndicator rather than multiple syndicators.
Although the large syndicators generally compete across similar levels of services, some
focus on specific niches. For example, one syndicator may specialize in funds containing
predominantly small properties - averaging 20 properties per fund instead of the typical 10 to 15.
Others may focus on particular regions of the country. A few states such as California have their
own state tax credit program in addition to using the federal LIHTC program. If investors are
interested in capturing California state tax credits in addition to federal tax credits, they may seek
a fund focusing on California.
Altogether the role of the syndicator heavily influences credit pricing. Both the services
explicitly provided and the ongoing relationships between the parties determine the price that
developers are willing to accept from syndicators and the price investors will pay for the funds.
The introduction of so many complicated factors into the pricing decision, including a number of
intangible qualities, suggest that credit pricing is often less of a science than an art.
Section 4.2 Alternative Pricing Model: Syndicators and Credit Pricing
The pivotal role of the syndicator in managing and mitigating traditional real estate risks
helps explain the lack of correlation between traditional risk factors and credit pricing. However,
one would expect to see a relationship between individual syndicators and credit pricing,
reflecting the type and level of services offered, as well as reputation and relationships with
investors and developers. Our data offer limited possibilities to explore the impact of different
types or quality of syndicators on credit pricing, since all syndicators in our sample tend to be
large, established, and for-profit, and offer very comparable levels of service and reputation. As
shown in the table below, there are both similarities and distinct differences across syndicators in
our sample by credit price.13
Table 4: Mean Credit Price Paid by Syndicator to Developer, by Syndicator
syndicator 1 .7331
Syndicator 2 .7757 11 1
Syndicator 3 .7822 44 4
Syndicator 4 .7988 40 3
Syndicator 5 .7308 11 1
Syndicator 6 .7611 27 4
Syndicator 7 .7596 10 1
Syndicator 8 .7171 7 1
Syndicator 9 .7973 23 2
All syndicators .7741 186 18
As shown in the table above, mean credit prices by syndicator fall within a fairly narrow
range, from $0.7171 to $0.7988 per dollar of credit. This probably reflects a number of factors,
including the time over which credits were purchased (1997-2000), the similarity of status across
syndicators, as discussed above, and the efficiency and competitiveness of the market for credits,
which force syndicators to offer comparable prices to developers. The distribution is skewed
slightly left, since the syndicators with more properties within the sample have higher mean
prices. In order to determine whether the difference between syndicators actually reflects some
value added from the syndicator or whether it merely reflects differences in the types of
properties purchased by the syndicator, we estimated a regression of credit price against all the
13 Although we have kept the syndicator names confidential, they are similar in location, size and service offerings.
real estate and financial characteristics described earlier including dummy variables for each
syndicator. In Table 5 below, Regression 4 shows the results of the earlier estimate for
comparison purposes, using only financial and operational risk factors. Regression 5 adds
dummy variables for each of the syndicators, excluding Syndicator 7 as the base case.
Regression 6 shows the identical regression, excluding Syndicator 8 as the base case, to give an
idea of the sensitivity of syndicator effects to one another. We have omitted the variables for
"Both family and elderly" and "Soft primary mortgage" because of the low number of
observations in these categories, and excluded "Market-rate primary loan" because of
multicollinearity with "Private primary lender."
Table 5: Estimated Regression of Property Characteristics and Syndicator on Credit
Price14
Total Development
Cost/Unit
8.68e-U8
(1.64e-07)
7.70e-08
(1.63e-07)
7.70e-08
(1 .63e-07)
Moderate Rental .0120 -.0044 -.0044
Discount (.0231) (.0208) (.0208)
Significant Rental .0143 -.0072 -.0072
Discount (.0200) (.0187) (.0187)
-.0033
(.0191)
-.0033
(.0191)
Very Significant .0139
Rental Discount (.0206)
1998 Credit .0170*1*
Allocation (. 0090)
1999 Credit .0370*"
Allocation (.0110)
2000 Credit .63
Allocation, (.19
Tax-exempt Bond .03*
(40164)
Private Primary -.0331*
14 Variables significant at either the 5 percent or ten percent level are shaded. * Indicates significance at the 5
percent level and ** indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Lender (.0163) (.0146) (0146)
Rural Housing .0220 -.0009 -.0009
Services Primary (.0215) (.0230) (.0230)
Lender
State Primary Lender -.0310** -.0276** -.0276*
(.0166) (.0161) (.0161) -
Soft Primary Loan .0093
(.0197)
Market Rate Primary -.0045
Loan (.0101)
Debt Coverage Ratio .0356 .0187 .0187
(.0236) (.0211) (.0211)
First Loan to Total .0138 .0082 .0082
Value Ratio (.0247) (.0231) (.0231)
Number of Debt .0035 .0002 .0002
Sources (.0039) (.0038) (.0038)
New Construction .0040 .0046 .0046
(.0092) (.0086) (.0086)
Midwest .0136 .0134 .0134
(.0138) (.0129) (.0129)
South -.0013 -.0015 -.0015
(.0131) (.0126) (.0126)
West -.0019 -.0039 -.0039
(.0131) (.0122) (.0122)
Family Property .0112 -.0026 -.0026
(.0082) (.0076) (.0076)
Family and Senior .0304*
Property (.0141)
Suburban Location .0097 .0019 .0019
(.0094) (.0093) (.0093)
Non-metro Location .0026 .0068 .0068
(.0098) (.0113) (.0113)
Non-profit .0003 -.0058 -.0058
Developer Involved (.0082) (.0083) (.0083)
Developer's Net 2.19e-13 7.82e-12 7.82e-12
Worth (5.79e-11) (5.36e-11) (5.36e-11)
Number of Income .0033 .0033 .0033
Level Set-asides (.0042) (.0043) (.0043)
Syndicator 1 
-.0094 -.0194
(.0222) (.0161)
Syndicator 2
Syndicator 4
.0120
(.0164)
.0220
(.0201)
Syndicator 3 .0236
Syndicator 5 .0125 .0225
(.0152) (.0146)
Syndicator 6 .0121 .0225**
(.0195) (.0146)
Syndicator 7 .0099
(.0212)
Syndicator 8 -.0099
(.0212)
Syndicator 9 .0531* .0531*
(.0185) (.06185)
Constant (intercept) .6563* .6893* .6793*
(.0429) (.0381) (.0381)
R-squared .4618 .5561 .5561
N 169 169 169
As shown in the table above, adding syndicator fixed effects to the regression yields the
same significant variables as found previously (total development cost, year, use of bonds,
primary loans from private and state lenders). Syndicator effects do not substantially alter the
magnitude of the coefficients on these variables, except for the years; this is probably due to
concentration of properties by syndicator within years, as will be discussed more below. There
are clearly some differences in credit price across syndicators, as well as some similarities. The
significance of the syndicator effects depends on which syndicator is used as the base case, since
several of the syndicators appear to have similar impacts on credit price - such as Syndicators 2,
5, and 6, as well as 1 and 8. However, the coefficients on Syndicator 4 and Syndicator 9 are
significantly larger than the others, regardless of the base case used, as shown in Regressions 4
and 5. Regression 5 shows that nearly all syndicators have a significantly higher mean price than
Syndicator 8. These relationships are consistent with those shown in Table 4, Mean Price by
Syndicator.
Moreover, it is highly possible that we are actually underestimating the effect of
syndicator differences by controlling for year of credit allocation. As Table 4 shows, for many
of the syndicators, our sample has only one fund, and the properties within that fund are highly
concentrated by year of allocation. Table 6 shows the distribution of properties for each
syndicator in our sample.
Table 6: Distribution of Syndicators' Properties by Year 15
Syndicator 1 .53 .47 .00 .00
Syndicator 2 .00 .00 .73 .27
Syndicator 3 .11 .42 .34 .13
Syndicator 4 .21 .56 .09 .09
Syndicator 5 .22 .67 .00 .00
Syndicator 6 .38 .12 .12 .38
Syndicator 7 .00 .11 .89 .00
Syndicator 8 .71 .14 .00 .00
Syndicator 9 .10 .14 .71 .05
All syndicators .22 .33 .30 .13
The syndicators for which we do have a more representative sample of properties across
funding years - Syndicators 3, 4, 6 and 9 - show the most significant differences. However, we
believe that year is indeed a significant determinant of credit pricing, and it is important to
control for year. Due to the small sample size and correlation between syndicators and other
variables, particularly year, and the similarities between syndicators in our sample, the
significance and magnitude of coefficients of each syndicator varies somewhat across regression
specifications. Nonetheless, from the results of the regressions and our knowledge of possible
underestimates, we can conclude that mean credit pricing does indeed vary by individual
syndicators. However, many syndicators may have similar impacts, particularly within our
homogenous sample.
Section 5: Effects of Syndicator Fees
5.1 Impacts of Fund Load Charges
Within the role of intermediary, the syndicator also acts to "transform products to add
value" (Spulber 7) in order to carve a profitable industry niche for their services. One of the
ways in which syndicators add value to investors is through compiling properties into investor
funds. Similar to mutual funds, each asset's risks are mitigated when combined with other
assets, thereby enhancing the value of each individual asset. Moreover, funds allow individual
investors to achieve a relatively high level of diversification in their portfolios, regardless of size.
Similar to insurance companies, syndicators "mutualize idiosyncratic risks so that insured
persons obtain approximately the same diversification as they would under complete markets"
(Freixas and Rochet 15). Syndicators use their internal underwriting guidelines, due diligence
procedures, market appraisals, and other risk assessment strategies not only to evaluate the
relative strength of individual properties, but also to design funds that offset and complement
weaknesses and strengths amongst the properties.
In exchange for compiling the fund, syndicators charge fees or a load. This load is built
into the price per unit of tax credit dollar that the investors pay. Developers do not directly pay
for the load, although they do indirectly pay for syndicator services through the trade-off
between higher loads (i.e. higher services) and lower price per credit. For example, a developer
may forego an offer of $0.82 per credit from a small syndicator offering few services and with
whom they have never worked, in exchange for $0.80 per credit from a large, reputable
syndicator with whom they have had personal contact or experience. Therefore, if a developer
agrees to sell a $1.00 of credit for $0.80, and the syndicator charges a load of 10 percent, the
15 A very small number of properties from years prior to 1997 are excluded from analysis.
syndicator will charge $0.88 to the investor and keep the $0.08 as profit. While the developer
tends to focus on offered price as a primary measure of return, the investors focus on the overall
fund IRR rather than individual property or even fund price per credit since the IRR incorporates
other benefits as well as the true value through discounting.
Due to our data limitations, the syndicators represented in our sample offer similar
services and charge similar loads to their investors. Therefore, it is difficult to determine exactly
the services offered in exchange for specific fees. In general, however; these loads are composed
of several different fees:
e Selling commissions - paid to brokers in exchange for arranging sales of limited
partnership interests in the Fund. Generally one to two percent.
e Organizational and offering expenses - services provided by the general partner.
Generally one to three percent and amortized over 60 months.
" Acquisition Expenses and Fees - fees related to compiling the funds. Generally one to
six percent and amortized over 27.5 years.
e Partnership management fee - managing fund in initial years. Generally one to two
percent.
" Asset Management Fee - generally around 0.5 percent of gross invested assets that can
be defined as net equity plus debt on all properties.
e Working capital reserve - Generally three to five percent of equity proceeds.
Some syndicators charge additional fees including structuring and advisory fees, construction
management, investor servicing, and financing fees. It is difficult to obtain information on the
precise nature of these services, particularly since some syndicators break the fees down
separately, but keep the overall load within the same range as other syndicators. Reasons for
variability in the loads include the overall size of the syndicator, the year of the offering, and the
size of the fund. Funds targeted towards specific investors also may have higher loads. For
example, some investors may be willing to pay a higher load for regional funds since they may
have non-market objectives such as CRA requirements that will lower their IRR threshold.
Syndicators also build a reserve into the load that impacts the overall load but is not captured by
the syndicator. This reserve is another way for syndicators to mitigate risk; by adjusting the size
of the reserve to the fund, they are able to offset potentially weaker funds with higher reserves
but not necessarily higher loads. Table 7 shows a summary of the breakdown of our data in
terms of unloaded prices paid by syndicators to developers, subloaded prices (prices with the
load but not the reserve), and the loaded prices (total prices) paid by investors to syndicators, as
well as percentages charged for both sub-load and reserve requirement. Tables 8 and 9 show
charts of the various syndicator prices and fees.
Table 7: Summary of Loaded and Unloaded Credit Prices and Loads, by Syndicator 6
Syndicator Unloaded Sub-loaded Loaded Sub- Reserve Load
pie ($) Price($ prc() Load (% %
Syndicator 1 .7331 .8278 .8590 12.92 3.16 16.08
Syndicator 2 .7757 .8630 .8938 11.26 3.96 15.22
Syndicator 3 .7822 .8626 .8939 10.31 4.02 14.33
Syndicator 4 .7988 .8734 .9046 9.37 3.91 13.28
Syndicator 5 .7308 .8063 .8404 10.33 4.67 15.00
Syndicator 6 .7611 .8393 .8701 10.30 4.05 14.35
Syndicator 7 .7596 .8394 .8583 10.5 2.5 13.00
Syndicator 8 .7171 .7841 .8284 9.35 6.17 15.52
Syndicator 9 .7973 .8745 .9032 9.69 3.59 13.28
All Syndicators .7741 .8534 .8838 10.24 3.92 14.17
16 Unloaded price is the price paid by syndicators to developers. Sub-loaded price adds the amount of load, fee for
services provided. Loaded price includes both sub-load and the reserve requirement.
Table 8: Syndicator Prices
Table 9: Syndicator Loads
Syndicator
Syndicator Loads
18.00%
16.00%
14.00%
o,12.00% 0 Reserve
10.00%
cc 8.00% -0Sub-Load
0 6.00% 
-oad
4.00%
2.00% 7
0.00%
Although loads clearly impact prices, differences in loads alone cannot explain the
pricing differences observed in the table above. High loads are not necessarily associated with
lower unloaded price or higher loaded price (for instance, Syndicator 1 has the largest load but
quite low prices, loaded and unloaded). We would expect the larger syndicators to be able to
command higher loads in the marketplace due to their reputation, resources, service offerings,
and general market power which should act to lower perceived risk by investors. However, our
sample does not bear out this expectation, perhaps due to the disproportionate number of funds
represented by each syndicator in our sample.
Reserve requirements vary considerably across syndicators, although the connection
between syndicator and reserve is not immediately apparent since a smaller reserve could either
indicate syndicators feel the fund is less risky and, therefore, requires less cushion or that it is
more risky and reserve limits are lowered in order to reduce the price of the investment to make
it more attractive to investors. There is no correlation within our sample between size of sub-
load and size of reserve (correlation of sub-load and reserve is 0.07). Since syndicators tend to
work closely with repeat investors and developers, they may adapt their reserve and loads to
meet particular investment objectives (for instance, more conservative investors may prefer
higher reserves). Additionally, syndicators often report their published load in the offering
documents, but later adjust it downward to achieve specific IRRs or investor objectives
(Floreani).
Given that syndicators charge fees for the services they provide and that these services
and their attendant fees are likely to vary across syndicators, we would expect the size of the
loads charged to have an impact on credit prices. The loads should impact fees in two ways;
developers should be willing to accept a lower price per unit of credit in exchange for a high
level of services and loads, while investors should be willing to pay more per unit of credit if the
cost includes more services. In this hypothesis, we have defined services very broadly to
encompass not only specific and quantifiable services, but also general reputation, level of
comfort, flexibility on negotiated terms, and other intangible "services" offered to both
developers and investors.
To test this hypothesis, we estimated several regressions, the results of which are shown
below in Table 8. In Regression 7, we estimated price per unit of credit paid to developers by
syndicators, including loads in addition to the independent variables used in previous models.
The load itself can be separated into two components: the sub-load, essentially the fee taken by
syndicators as compensation for the services they provide, and the reserve requirement, set aside
for contingency use for the properties. While the reserve does not actually accrue to the
syndicator, it is considered part of the total load. Regression 8 shows the impact of controlling
for sub-load and reserve separately.
Table 10: Estimated Regression of Syndicator and Load Components on Unloaded Credit
Price17
Total Development Cost/Unit 6.3le-08
(1.55e-07)
6.58e-08
(1 .54e-07)
Moderate Rental Discount -.0071 -.0064
(.0202) (.0211)
Significant Rental Discount -.0145 -.0136
(.0188) (.0199)
Very Significant Rental Discount -.0110 -.0102
(.0193) (.0202)
1998 Credit Allocation .0116 .0117
" Variables significant at the five or ten percent level are shaded. * Indicates significance at the 5 percent level and
** indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
(.0099) (.0099)
1999 Credit Allocation .0172 .0179
(.0131) (.0142)
2000 Credit Allocation .0356* .0366*
(.0153) (.0166)
Tax-Exempt Bond .0302* .0308*
(,0156) (.0160)
Private Primary Lender -0307" -.0308*
(.0142) (.0143)
Rural Housing Services Primary .0004 .0009
Lender (.0224) (.0228)
State Primary Lender -.0274** -.0273**
(.0155) (.0156)
Debt Coverage Ratio .0194 .0188
(.0201) (.0209)
First Loan to Value Ratio .0073 .0064
(.0219) (.0232)
Number of Debt Sources -.0007 -.0009
(.0037) (.0038)
New Development .0036 .0034
(.0085) (.0084)
Midwest .0154 .0155
(.0125) (.0126)
South .0005 .0009
(.0122) (.0125)
West -.0012 -.0008
(.0120) (.0123)
Family Property .0017 .0016
(.0074) (.0074)
Suburban Location .0056 .0056
(.0091) (.0091)
Non-metro Location .0089 .0091
(.0110) (.0109)
Non-profit developer involved -.0100 -.0104
(.0081) (.0079)
Developer's Net Worth 2.16e- 1l 1.99e-1 1
(5.82e-11) (5.94e-11)
Number of Set Asides .0033 .0034
(.0042) (.0043)
Syndicator 1
Syndicator 2
Syndicator 3
Syndicator 4
.0304
(02%)
.0300
(.0260)
(.0160) (.0260)
Syndicator 5 .0221 .0277
(.0166) (.0271)
Syndicator 6 .0305 .0343
(.0222) (.0265)
Syndicator 7
Syndicator 8 .0097 .0205
(0249) (.0493)
Syndicator 9 .0560* .0635*
(.0187) (.0225)
Load -.9888*
(.4515)-
Sub-load -.8953
(.6609)
Reserve -1.242
(1.018)
Constant (intercept) .8301* .8264*
(.0710) (.0751)
R-squared .5738 .5740
N 169 169
Coefficients on several of the syndicators show up as having significant impacts on both
the unloaded credit prices, as well as the variables previously determined to have significant
impacts on pricing. Load has a significant negative impact on unloaded credit price, confirming
our hypothesis that developers are willing to accept a lower price in exchange for more services.
However, this finding is complicated by the questionable assertion that higher loads translate into
higher services for the developers. Most developers we spoke with felt that syndicators offer
very comparable but limited services and, therefore, they did not select the syndicator primarily
on service offerings. Similar to investors, they tend to select syndicators based on price offered
and market reputation.
Additionally, negotiations between developers and syndicators are not limited to price
and specific service offerings. Other negotiable items can include pay-in schedules, reduced
operating deficit guarantees, forgiveness of prior debt to the syndicator, promises for future
prices, and specific services in exchange for developer loyalty (Floreani). Therefore, these
elements of negotiation between syndicators and developers - on which our dataset has no
measurements - may also determine credit price or impact developers' choice of syndicator,
despite price considerations. It is interesting to note that the syndicator differences are much less
pronounced when controlling for sub-load and reserve separately than using the combined load
effect. There is more variation across syndicators by each separate component than by overall
load, due in part to the lack of correlation between the two. It seems more likely that developers
would be sensitive to the overall price than to the individual components of the load.
Table 11 shows the effect of loads on loaded price per unit of credit, paid by investors to
syndicators. In order to identify the effect of the load itself, we controlled for the underlying
credit price paid by syndicators to purchase the credits, as well as the usual property and
financial characteristics. From the investor standpoint, we would expect higher loads to be
associated with higher loaded prices, since investors should be willing to pay higher prices in
exchange for more services, shown by higher loads. Conversely, the syndicator should be able to
offer the investor lower prices if they provide fewer services and a correspondingly lower load.
Regression 9 shows the impact on loaded credit price of syndicator, sub-load and reserve,
controlling for unloaded credit price, as well as property and financial characteristics.
Regression 10 breaks down the impact of sub-load reserve separately, while Regression 11 offers
a comparison using a different syndicator as base case.
Table 11: Estimated Regression of Syndicator and Load Components on Loaded Credit
Price18
Dependent variable: Loaded rice per unt of credit
Independent variables (9) (10) (11)
Total Development Cost 415e10 42 4.28e-10*
(2.62e-10) (2.61e-10) (2.61e-10)
Total Development 7.17e-08 6.73e-08 6.73e-08
Cost/Unit (5.38e-08) (5.45e-08) (5.45e-08)
Moderate Rental Discount .0141* .0130* .0130*
(.0060) (.006) (.0060)
Significant Rental Discount .0079 .0065 .0065
(.0062) (.0063) (.0063)
Very Significant Rental .0123* .0110** .0110**
Du (.0061) (.0060) (0060)
1998 Credit Allocation .0066* .06*.0064*
(.0027) (.0027) (.0027)
1999 Credit Allocation .0238* .0226* .0226*
(.0042) (.0044) (.0044)
2000 Credit Allocation .0393* .0375* .0375*
__(.0060) (.0064) (.0064)
Tax-Exempt Bond .0133* .0123*- .0123*
____(.0047) (.0047) (.0047)
Private Primary Lender ..0108* 1* .0111*
(.0037) (,0037), (.0037)
Rural Housing Services .0018* .0110* .0110*
Primary Lender (.0054) (003 (.0053)
State Primary Lender .0056 .0055 .0055
(.0034) (.0034) (.0034)
Debt Coverage Ratio -.0036 -.0025 -.0025
(.0049) (.0050) (.0050)
First Loan to Value Ratio .0062 .0076 .0076
(.0076) (.0076) (.0076)
Number of Debt Sources .0017 .0020 .0020
(.0013) (.0014) (.0014)
New Development .0034 .0036 .0036
(.0030) (.0031) (.0031)
Midwest 
.0100* - -
(.04)(,004,5)- (.0045)
South -.0053 -.0060 -.0060
____(.0049) (.0050) (.0050)
West 
-. 01 .009'7* -.0)097*
(.005) .005) (.0045)
Family Property .0019 .0022 .0022
18 Variables significant at either five or ten percent level are shaded. * Indicates significance at the 5 percent level
and ** indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
I
(.0027) (.0026) (.0026)
Suburban Location -.0009 -.0009 -.0009
(0030) (.0029) (.0029)
Non-metro Location -.0072* -0075* -.0075*
;'.029)(.0029) (.0029)
Non-profit developer -.0062* -.0055**-,0
involved (.003) (.0031) (.0031)
Developer's Net Worth 1.21e-1 -9.31e- 12 -9.31e-12
(2.10e-11) (2.07e-11) (2.07e-11)
Number of Set Asides -.0009 -.0011 -.0011
(.0012) (.0012)
Syndicator I .423* .0149* .31*
(03)(.068) (.0132)
Syndicator 2 _.0251* .'0203* .039
(su70) e087 8812)
Syndicator 3 .05*.22 0448*
(06 094).
Syndicator 4 .45,0394* .560*
(.0065) (08) .04
Syndicator 5 -.0026 -.0119 .0047
(.0066) (.0089) (.0080)
Syndicator 6 .0084 .0019 084
(.0072) (.0081)(.03
Syndic ator 7 .0166
(.0142)
Syndicator 8 .0015 -.0166
_ _ _ _ _ __0 _ _ _ _ (.0142)
Syndicator 9 .03*02 .45
Load 23*
Sub_ load h9 s ng
Reserve .1805 .1805
____ _ _ ___ ___ _  (.3030) (.3030)
Unloaded price per unit of .123*12* .;11253*
credit Y05)(04}(23
Constant (intercept) .7687* .7742* .7742*
(.0317) (.0307) (.0307)
R-squared .8901 .8918 .8918
N 169 169 169
As seen above, both total load and sub-load have significant negative impacts on loaded
price per credit, although the coefficient on sub-load is much smaller than in the estimated
impact of sub-load on unloaded price, suggesting that while developers are willing to accept a
lower price for more services, investors are not willing to pay more to obtain those services.
This perhaps indicates that most of the pricing burden of loads is borne by developers, so that
syndicators do not need to raise their price to investors to recoup the costs.
This theory is consistent with the likelihood of adverse selection amongst LIHTC
developers. Since the competition for the credits is high, allocating agencies tend to spread the
credits among numerous developers, rather than in proportion to the size of the developers.
Therefore, the nation's largest and most experienced developers tend to have a limited presence
in the tax credit field. Many of the developers represented in our sample may be relatively small,
geographically isolated, and less experienced than the typical multifamily developer. In order to
sell their credits, these smaller investors must go through syndicators. Unlike investors who have
a myriad of options both within tax credits and in other investments, developers are relatively
captive to the market prices and service offerings of syndicators. Therefore, one hypothesis is
that developers indirectly bear much of the cost of the load and are less price-sensitive than
investors (or more constrained in their choice of syndicator).
The results of the regression appear to suggest that high loads are associated with low
loaded prices. This appears counter to the expectation that higher services and higher loads
should reduce risk and result in higher prices. In other words, the market does not appear to be
efficiently pricing the risk mitigation services of the syndicators against the expected risk of the
investment. Although some of this puzzle can be explained by data limitations as described
earlier, we suspect that the counterintuitive findings relate to the complicated manner in which
investor returns are measured; namely IRR. From our interviews, it appears that investors base
their investment decision on three primary characteristics: meeting an IRR threshold, loads
within reasonable market ranges, and other intangible qualities such as comfort level and
experience with the syndicator. In conversations with industry players, many were not surprised
by these findings and felt that it was entirely plausible to find high loads associated with low
prices or alternate correlations. Even when controlling for the effect of loads on prices, there are
statistically significant differences in loaded prices across syndicators, possibly as a result of the
relationship or timing factors described above which are not captured by our data.
Since investors base their investment decisions primarily on IRR, they tend to disregard
price per credit as a metric in itself. As a result, the impact of price per credit tends to get
diffused through the overall IRR calculation. Syndicators also likely prefer that investors
evaluate IRR over credit price since it gives syndicators more control and flexibility to adjust the
many factors comprising IRR in order to meet an investor's objective. In other words,
syndicators have a relatively small range of prices they offer developers due to market
competition and their own need for profitable spreads. However, they can adjust the IRR
through other aspects such as timing, load adjustments, and estimated real estate benefits, in
order to achieve a specified IRR without changing the price paid to the developer.
Although investors pay relatively little attention to capital structure, they can be sensitive
to the investment effects of the structure. For example, 4 percent credits provide a higher
percentage of the IRR benefits through losses rather than credits. Benefits accrued through
losses tend to be less desirable since they are more dependent on the real estate performance and,
therefore, less predictable than credits. Corporations sensitive to reporting losses on earnings
statements, even accounting rather than financial losses, will seek more of their benefits through
credits than losses. Other corporations are unable to use credits temporarily due to their tax
status and may seek investments that either allow them to meet non-market objectives or that
may provide other real estate benefits through losses and resale value. Others seek out the least
risky projects that in some cases can result from heavy use of public subsidies. Since the risk of
foreclosure is low for soft and concessionary loans, investors tend to view these favorably.
However, the more soft sources, the more difficult the project may be to manage and the
perceived risk may be higher. Therefore, while we would expect the unloaded price per credit to
have some correlation to the load for the developer, the seemingly counterintuitive results of load
on investor price may be the result of omitted variable bias, if other components of investor IRR
unmeasured in our sample date are correlated with both loads and credit price.
Section 6: Implications and Future Research
6.1 Financial and Policy Implications
Because the successful production of affordable housing is dependent on investors
continuing to perceive the LIHTC as an attractive investment, reasonably predictive and
transparent risk/return profiles of the investments are important. As historical data shows, as
investors have become more comfortable with and gained more information about the program,
perceived risks and thus yields have declined. The decreasing risk perception has resulted in
more competition, driving equity prices up and loads down, and ensuring that more equity goes
directly to developments. Therefore, the industry's continued success is dependent on
increasingly better ways to monitor and standardize risk assessment. In other financial
industries, particularly those involving fund investments, benchmarking indices and outside
rating agencies have allowed investors to more accurately compare risk and price it accordingly.
We would recommend a similar approach in the LIHTC industry. Agencies that currently
monitor developments for compliance could also more explicitly capture the financial structure
and health of the developments so as to better predict financially successful projects that will
ultimately improve all the program's objectives.
In addition to better industry indexing standards, we would urge the investment
community to consider credit prices more explicitly in their investment decisions. While the
price can be "backed out" from IRR calculations, as we have seen from our data, this process
tends to be more of a black box than a reflection of an efficiently operating market. Prices
should reflect the anticipated risk and return structure of both the developers and investors.
Loaded prices should reflect the value that developers and investors place on syndicator services.
Although the IRR is a useful measure for LIHTC investments since it measures benefits beyond
the credits and discounts the benefits stream, it is also highly sensitive and difficult to discern the
true risk and value of each of its components. Ideally, the price per credit should reflect the true
value of the credit; a value that should be looked at both separately and in relation to other
LIHTC benefits.
Changes in the legislative direction of the LIHTC will also continue to change the
industry and investment objectives. Syndicators have told us with the declining yields, some
investors are starting to enact their threshold. Since the allocation increase in 2000, some
investors are also waiting on the sidelines in anticipation of lower prices once competition eases.
The full result of this increased allocation is yet to be determined. Some predict that less
desirable developments will be funded, while others argue that higher quality developments
should result since allocating agencies will no longer be as restricted in only selecting projects
that are located in the most distressed areas. Clearly, the comfort level and broad legislative
support for the LIHTC program has left a significant impact on all housing programs. President
Bush has proposed in his 2001-2002 budget creating a Single Family Homeownership Tax
Credit that would operate similarly to the LIHTC by providing credits to developers of
communities of single-family homes in distressed areas. The investor community response to
the proposal has been positive, and if implemented the program will likely go through less initial
uncertainty and underuse than the LIHTC in its early years.
Finally, because of the diffuse structure of the tax credit, there are few large-scale and
consolidated sources of information on LIHTC developments, particularly the financial
characteristics of these developments. Further research in this area would be greatly aided by
indices and more easily accessible financial data on developments.
6.2 Directions for Future Research
This study explored the impacts of various property and financial risk characteristics, as
well as syndicator fixed effects, on credit pricing in order to estimate the sensitivity of investors
and developers to risk. We believe that this general area affords a number of potentially
interesting topics for future research. It appears that price is not the best estimate of investor
preferences; a similar type of study focusing on IRR as the unit of measurement would provide
better insight into how investors perceive risk, and how sensitive they are to changes in
perceived risk. Also, our sample provided a limited range of syndicator types. Thus the types of
properties in the funds are of similar desirability and display similar characteristics, particularly
in the level of difficulty and risk. A comparison between different types of syndicators,
including non-profit syndicators such as the National Equity Fund and single-investor funds like
those held by Fannie Mae, might reveal wider differences in the types of underlying assets and
the relative levels of risk of tax credit investment. Similarly, a study of how funds are packaged
might highlight some of the investor preferences that syndicators aim to meet; for instance,
single state funds to meet CRA requirements, and diversified funds that minimize risk compared
to more restricted funds that possibly aim for higher returns.
Finally, the general conclusions of this study offer some possible areas of policy research.
In particular, what is the connection between funds (or properties) that meet investor returns and
properties that fulfill their mission of providing well-run and desirable affordable housing to
residents? In short, are the investments meeting both the public and private goals? Additionally,
our data give information on planned properties; it would be worthwhile to assess past
performance to see whether expected returns materialize, and whether the indicated level of risk
truly predicts fund performance, and how LIHTC returns compare to similar fund investments.
Conclusion
Tax credit pricing is a complicated process and gives a somewhat oblique measure of
underlying risks. While traditional real estate characteristics play some role in determining
price, more important components include the role played by syndicators through their
relationships with developers and investors, as well as the relative negotiation power of the
parties and the presence of alternative options. The tax credit market displays typical
characteristics that invite the presence of intermediaries, including information asymmetries,
need for specialized knowledge, and high transactions costs. From our data analysis, it appears
that developers have less power in the price negotiation than investors, possibly due to their
restricted options; developers must select a syndicator through which to sell their credits, while
investors may choose between syndicators with more information and also have alternative
investment options, including the option not to invest at all.
Our estimated model, while highlighting some of the components of pricing, is not able
to capture many of the subtler elements that determine price, such as timing of the investment or
the intangible qualities of the relationships and comfort level, as well as non-market objectives of
the investors. Additionally, it is apparent that IRR would be a more effective means of gauging
investor risk perceptions than credit price, due to the complicated calculation of IRR. From the
investment perspective, tax credits are more of a commodity purchase than a real estate
investment; our analysis reveals the gulf between investors and the underlying property.
Investors may know very little about the properties in the funds that they purchase, and for their
returns, the level of their knowledge is nearly irrelevant.
The objective of the tax credit program - to provide equity for affordable housing by
tapping into private capital markets - appears to be met through the mechanisms established. To
date, an increasing level of competition suggests that investors are receiving their desired returns,
and certainly the program has resulted in the production of low-income housing that otherwise
would likely not have been built. Yet although the goal is to align public and private interests,
there appears to be a vast gap in knowledge between the two sides. Just as investors know very
little about the properties that have been constructed using their capital, residents know nothing
about the investors who own their homes. Similarly, no one public agency or organization tracks
both the financial performance and the housing product. In fact, the industry is largely self-
policing, managed by the intermediaries that mediate interests and are most deeply involved
throughout the process. Syndicators seem to play much the same role that Alfred Chandler
identified for corporate management: the "visible hand" that prods markets into smooth
functioning. As long as all parties are pleased with the results - investors get their desired
returns, developers are able to construct properties, and residents and communities are pleased
with the final product - the system seems prepared to continue operating in essentially the same
way. To this extent, then, the program would seem to be working just as its designers intended.
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Appendix A: Data Fields
General characteristics
Property ID
Fund name
Property name
Total units
evelopment type: New, rehab, historic
City
State
Metropolitan area (where noted)
Region: See Appendix B
Tenant type: Family; elderly; both
Location: Urban, suburban, non-metro
Has property amente
Developer Characteristics
For-profit/Non-profit developer or both
Developer net worth
Develoner liauiditv
Lender status (private, public, non-profit)
Loan status: Soft, hard, grant, bond
Market or concessionary interest rate
Amount of loan/grant
Amortization term
Loan term
Interest rate
Tax Exempt Bonds
Rental suport: Section 8, RHS, other
Rent and Market (four set-asides)
Percent of units set aside
Income level of set aside
Low end of rental discount compared to market
High end of rental discount compared to market
Concerns about neighborhood (crime, etc)
Debt coverage ratio
Tax credit allocation year
Use of tax-exempt bonds
Price per unit of credit
Federal credits allocated
Credits to investor partnership
Net equity from tax credit investors
State credits allocated
Total debt dollars
Total grant dollars
Total capitalization
Total development cost per unit
Appendix B: Definitions of Regions
